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Abstract
We propose a fully probabilistic formulation of the notion of mechanistic
interaction between the effects of putative causal factors A and B in pro-
ducing an outcome event Y . We define mechanistic interaction in terms
of departure from a generalized “noisy OR” model, under which the multi-
plicative causal effect of A (resp., B) on the probability of positive outcome
(Y = 1) cannot be enhanced by manipulating B (resp., A).We present condi-
tions under which mechanistic interaction in the above sense can be assessed
via simple tests on excess risk or superadditivity, in a possibly retrospective
regime of observation. These conditions are defined in terms of conditional
independence relationships that can often be checked on a graphical repre-
sentation of the problem. Inference about mechanistic interaction between
direct, or path-specific, causal effects can be accommodated in the proposed
framework. The method is illustrated with the aid of a study in experimental
psychology.
Keywords: Causal inference, compositional epistasis, direct effects, directed
acyclic graphs, excess risk, experimental psychology, independent effects,
noisy OR, observational studies, path-specific effects, superadditivity.
1 Introduction
Consider an outcome event whose probability responds to manipulations of two
variables, A and B. We are interested in whether the effects of A and B interact
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in producing the event in some fundamental mechanistic sense. For example, we
might be interested in whether an environmental exposure A interferes with the
effect of a drug B on a disease at some mechanistic—presumably molecular—
level. Such a relationship, which we shall make more formal in a later section of
this paper, we call mechanistic interaction.
Let the binary variable Y indicate positive (Y = 1) or negative (Y = 0) out-
come. One might begin to investigate mechanistic interaction by fitting a regres-
sion model of the dependence of Y on (A,B) and then testing for presence of sta-
tisticalA×B interaction, but such a test will depend on the chosen response scale,
and will generally not be interpretable in any deep mechanistic sense. Hence the
need for a mathematical formalization of mechanistic (as opposed to statistical)
interaction, and of the conditions under which this phenomenon can be detected
from empirical data via appropriate, response-scale independent, statistical tests.
In many applications, discovery of mechanistic interaction could represent a step
forward in the understanding of the studied system. In genetics, evidence of mech-
anistic interaction between two genes with respect to a phenotype of interest could
point to the molecular mechanisms implicated [Bernardinelli et al., 2012].
Ideally we would wish to assess mechanistic interaction by a controlled experi-
ment, but this is often not possible or not convenient. Various authors have pro-
posed tests for inferring mechanistic interaction (suitably defined) from observa-
tional data [Rothman, 1976, Rothman and Greenland, 1998, Greenland and Poole,
1988, Skrondal, 2003, VanderWeele and Robins, 2008, 2009, VanderWeele, 2009,
2010a,b, 2011, VanderWeele et al., 2011, VanderWeele and Laird, 2011]. Con-
sider, for example, the case where A and B are binary, and let C denote a further
(possibly empty) set of observed variables. Let Rabc denote the observational risk
of a positive outcome, Y = 1, conditional on A = a, B = b, C = c. Then, in
certain observational situations, and under certain conditions, the following prop-
erties (of which the first is stronger than the second) have been shown to imply
some form of mechanistic interaction:
Excess risk:
R11c −R10c − R01c > 0. (1)
Superadditivity:
R11c − R10c − R01c +R00c > 0. (2)
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These can be alternatively expressed as:
Excess risk:
S10c + S01c − S11c > 1, (3)
Superadditivity:
S10c + S01c − S11c − S00c > 0, (4)
where Sijc := 1 − Rijc is the corresponding probability of negative outcome (of
Y = 0). More precisely, the above conditions give criteria for synergistic mech-
anistic interaction between A and B in producing the outcome event, in that the
combined effect (suitably measured) of increases in A and in B to increase the
probability of a positive outcome is greater than expected on the basis of their
individual effects. This is the interpretation we shall maintain here. The case
of antagonistic mechanistic interaction, where the the combined effect is smaller
than expected, is readily handled by interchanging the values 0 and 1 for Y , and
interchanging the Rs and Ss in equations (1)–(4) and elsewhere. An important
property of the above tests is that they are (at least approximately, under assump-
tions) testable under retrospective sampling.
Most work to date on mechanistic interaction has been formulated assuming the
potential outcome (PO) framework [Rubin, 1974] for causality or some essentially
equivalent formulation, though the literature also offers some purely probabilistic
approaches. The former category is exemplified by the stochastic PO approach
of VanderWeele and Robins [2012]; the latter is exemplified by previous work of
the authors of this paper [Berzuini and Dawid, 2013] and by the recent paper of
Ramsahai [2013]. Section 8 discusses these approaches and their limitations.
2 Assumptions and notation
We are interested in the way the probability distribution of Y would react to
real or hypothetical manipulations of causal factors A and B, and in particular
whether or not the effects of A and B on Y can be regarded as interacting in some
fundamental mechanistic sense. In order to address this, we must first understand
what might be meant by “no mechanistic interaction”. Here we suggest a possible
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explication of this concept. This however is not absolute, but relative to an appro-
priately chosen “context”. That is, we specify certain context variables W in the
problem, which might modify in some way the dependence of Y on (A,B), and
only consider this dependence within a fixed context, i.e., conditional on fixed val-
ues W = w. Different choices of the variables in W for different causal questions
are possible in the same problem.
In contrast to the formulation of Berzuini and Dawid [2013], we do not require
that Y be a deterministic function of (A,B,W ), but allow for a fully stochastic
dependence of Y on these inputs. Note that this allows considerable freedom in
the selection of the context variables. Indeed, even in those rare cases when there
does exist a choice for W supporting a deterministic relationship, this might be
regarded as inhabiting too deep a level of description to be useful for the purpose
at hand, and a more coarse-grained choice, yielding a genuinely stochastic rela-
tionship, could be more appropriate. In any given application, care must be taken
to ensure that we are arguing at a suitable level of granularity. As an analogy, for
most purposes it is appropriate to think of the determination of the sex of an em-
bryo as governed by a random process (essentially a fair coin toss), even though
a very detailed description of the positions, motions, properties and behaviours of
the gametes prior to fertilisation might allow deterministic prediction.
Our definition of “no mechanistic interaction” will relate to a (possibly hypothet-
ical) “interventional regime”, in which the values of A and B are set by some
external agent or process. However, the data available to investigate this property
will generally have been generated under some other, typically purely observa-
tional, regime, where, in particular, the values of A and B have arisen in some
uncontrolled stochastic way. We will need to be able to relate these regimes in
order to transfer information from one to the other. To streamline this task we
introduce the regime indicator σAB , a non-stochastic variable, where σAB = ab
indicates the interventional regime whereA is set to a andB to b, and σAB = ∅ the
observational regime. More generally, σX will denote a similar regime indicator
for interventions on a set X of variables of interest.
We introduce the symbol
piw(a, b) := P (Y = 0 |W = w, σAB = ab), (5)
for the probability of a negative outcome in context W = w, when A and B are
set to respective values a and b by an exogenous intervention. Then one way—
which we shall henceforth adopt—of understanding the effect (A,B) on Y is by
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considering the dependence of piw(a, b) on (a, b). We shall measure the effect
exerted on Y by a change of the values set for (A,B) from (a′, b′) to (a, b) by the
relative probability of negative outcome (RPNO),
piw(a, b)
piw(a
′ , b′)
,
with the value 1 representing “no effect”.
2.1 Structural conditions
We shall impose the following structural conditions:
Condition 1 The causal factors A and B are continuous or ordered categorical
scalar random variables.
Condition 2 The effects of A and B on Y are positive: for any fixed (b, w) (resp.,
(a, w)), P (Y = 1 | W = w, σAB = ab) is a non-decreasing function of a (resp.,
b).
An alternative expression of Condition 2 is that piw(a, b), given by (5), is, for each
w, a non-increasing function of each of a and b.
3 No mechanistic interaction
We henceforth make the structural assumptions of the previous section.
3.1 Point null hypothesis
One possible way of expressing the concept of no mechanistic interaction between
A and B in producing the outcome event is that, for all w, we can express piw(a, b)
in the product form
piw(a, b) = λw(a)µw(b) (6)
for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B. We term this the point null hypothesis.
Equation (6) can alternatively be expressed as requiring:
For all a, a′ ∈ A, b, b′ ∈ B,
piw(a, b)piw(a
′, b′) = piw(a, b
′)piw(a
′, b) (7)
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or, when the denominators are positive,
piw(a, b)
piw(a′, b)
=
piw(a, b
′)
piw(a′, b′)
(8)
or
piw(a, b) =
piw(a
′, b) piw(a, b
′)
piw(a′, b′)
. (9)
When both A and B are binary this is equivalent to the single requirement
piw(1, 1) = piw(1, 0)piw(0, 1)/piw(0, 0). (10)
In the special case that piw(0, 0) = 1, this becomes
piw(1, 1) = piw(1, 0)piw(0, 1). (11)
Imposing the further requirements piw(1, 0) = piw(0, 1) = 0 would now imply
piw(1, 1) = 0, (12)
and this constellation of values represents Y as the Boolean expression A OR B.
The intermediate case of piw(0, 0) = 1 together with (11) is the “noisy OR” gen-
eralisation of this, while the general expression (10) is “leaky noisy OR” [Pearl,
1988, Lemmer and Gossink, 2004, Zagorecki and Druzdzel, 2004].
The point null hypothesis models the negative outcome as the result of two uncer-
tain causes failing to produce Y = 1, the first cause failing with a probability that
depends on W and on the value we force on A, and the second cause failing with
a probability that depends on W and on the value we force on B. imagine Player
1 being assigned a ball of size A = a and Player 2 a ball of size B = b, and then
each player being invited to knock his respective pin down. Let us call it a positive
event (Y = 1) when at least one of the two players knocks the pin over, and let
Y = 0 indicate instead that no pin is knocked over. Think of piw(a, b) as repre-
senting the probability of Y = 0 with assigned ball sizes (a, b) and with W = w
indicating specific circumstances such as air humidity, temperature. Structural
condition 2 will be satisfied here if we assume that each player’s ability to knock
the pin down will not decrease on being assigned a bigger ball. In the context
of this example the point null hypothesis, as expressed by Equation (6), asserts
that the probability of Y = 0 is the product of the probability λw(a) that Player
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1 fails to knock the pin down, and the probability µw(b) that Player 2 fails. The
mechanistic interpretation of this being that the performance of one player is not
affected by the size of the ball given to the other player. In the context of this
example, Equation (8) explicitly states that the RPNO effect of giving one player
a larger ball will not be changed by giving a larger ball also to the other one.
3.2 Interval null hypothesis
Taking into account that we are only interested in synergistic (as opposed to antag-
onistic) interaction, we can weaken the above point null hypothesis, as expressed
by (8) or (9), to yield the following interval null hypothesis:
For all w, and all a ≥ a′ ∈ A, b ≥ b′ ∈ B, we have
piw(a, b)
piw(a′, b)
≥
piw(a, b
′)
piw(a′, b′)
. (13)
On account of Condition 2, both sides of the inequality are ≤ 1, as they represent
the RPNO effect of increasing A while keeping B fixed at a particular value. A
large departure from 1 means the effect is strong. The inequality states that an
interventional increase in B will not strengthen the effect of an interventional
increase in A. The interpretation holds with the roles of A and B interchanged.
We may equivalently express the interval null hypothesis as
piw(a, b) ≥
piw(a
′, b) piw(a, b
′)
piw(a′, b′)
. (14)
3.3 Mechanistic interaction
Definition 3.1 We say that the causal factors A and B exhibit mechanistic inter-
action, or that their effects interfere, in producing a positive outcome, when the
interval null hypothesis (and so a fortiori the point null hypothesis) fails: that is
to say, when there exists a value w of the context variable W and values a > a′
for A, and b > b′ for B, such that
piw(a, b)piw(a
′, b′) < piw(a
′, b)piw(a, b
′). (15)
When this holds, we write A ∗ B [W ], or A ∗ B when W ≡ ∅. This notation
makes it explicit that the property is relative to the specified context variable W .
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Because we focus on synergy, we have defined “interference to produce”; we
could similarly define its antagonism counterpart, “interference to prevent”.
If Equation (15) holds then clearly piw(a′, b)0, piw(a, b′) > 0. Also piw(a′, b′) > 0
for, if it were not so, all terms of the equation would be 0 by virtue of Condition 2.
Thus Definition 3.1 applies just when there exist w, a > a′, b > b′ such that
piw(a, b)
piw(a′, b)
<
piw(a, b
′)
piw(a′, b′)
. (16)
Inequality (15) represents a stochastic extension of the deterministic mechanis-
tic interaction concept of Berzuini and Dawid [2013]. Under such deterministic
dependence of Y on (A,B,W ), each term in (15) can only take values 0 or 1.
Together with Condition 2, this implies:
piw(a, b) = 0 < piw(a
′, b) = piw(a, b
′) = piw(a
′, b′) = 1. (17)
The above inequality says that there are values b, b′ ∈ B such that, in some context
W = w, when we set B = b a manipulation of A from a′ to a causes Y to change
from 0 to 1; whereas, in the same context, when we set B = b′, the same manip-
ulation makes no difference to Y . In other words, whenever Y is deterministic,
presence of mechanistic interaction in our formulation is characterized by the fact
that we can prevent a certain manipulation ofA from producing the outcome event
through an appropriate action on B; and vice versa. If further A and B are binary,
then (a, a′, b, b′) = (1, 0, 1, 0), and the definition says that A and B interact mech-
anistically in producing Y = 1 when there exists a value w of the context variable
W such that the dependence of Y on (A,B) obeys the Boolean conjunction law:
Y = A ∧B.
4 Observational identification of mechanistic inter-
action
We now consider how we might use observational data to assess the presence or
absence of mechanistic interaction between the effects of A and B on Y . We shall
do this be means of a set C ⊆ W of observed context variables; the remaining
variables U =W \ C may be observed or unobserved.
We shall need to consider, in addition to the structural conditions of § 2.1, some
causal conditions, relating the behaviours under observational and interventional
8
circumstances. These we express as follows, where we have used the symbol ⊥⊥
for “conditionally independent of” [Dawid, 1979, 2002].
Condition 3 Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (A,B,W ).
Condition 4 U ⊥⊥ (A,B, σAB) | C.
Finally, we shall sometimes require observational independence between A and
B, conditional on C:
Condition 5 A⊥⊥B | (C, σAB).
Condition 3 requires that the effects of A and B on Y be “unconfounded”, con-
ditional on the context variables W . Condition 4 says that, conditional on C, the
distribution of U is fixed: the same under both interventional and observational
conditions and, further, independent of the values of A and B. Condition 5 holds
trivially for an interventional regime σAB = ab, so only has force for the observa-
tional regime σAB = ∅. It is a strong condition, but in certain circumstances can
be avoided—see Corollary 1 below.
4.1 Causal diagrams
It will sometimes be possible to represent a coherent set of causal and condi-
tional independence assumptions about the problem by using an extension [Dawid,
2002] of the methodology of directed acyclic graphs [Cowell et al., 1999]. The
extension, called an influence diagram (ID), incorporstes the relevant regime indi-
cators in the graph as decision nodes sending arrows into the variables they relate
to. The resulting ID expresses conditional independence relationships between
problem variables and regime indicators. These independencies can be read off
the graph with the aid of a graphical criterion such as d-separation [Geiger et al.,
1990] or its moralisation equivalent [Lauritzen et al., 1990]. By so doing, we can
check whether the required conditions for the validity of our interaction tests are
satisfied.
Figure 1, for example, might represent the effects of genetic variants A and B on
myocardial infarction Y , possibly mediated by obesity M , with G representing a
set of observed descriptors (diet, social status, etc.) of socio-economic status. In
the same diagram, the regime indicators σAB and σM specify the regimes under
9
YG
M
A
B
σM
σG
σAB
Figure 1: In an influence diagram such as this, variables may depend on their prede-
cessors in the graph in a fully stochastic way. Regime nodes, here σAB , σM and σG,
determine whether the variables into which they send arrows are manipulated (interven-
tional regime) or observed (observational regime). This diagram is also used in Examples
1-3
which the values of (A,B) and of M , respectively, are generated, be it by passive
observation or by intervention.
For a problem that can be modelled by the ID of Figure 1, causal conditions 3–5
follow by application of the moralisation criterion to the graph if we choose the
sets W,U and C to be empty.
4.2 Main theorem
Our observational criterion for mechanistic interaction will involve a dichotomi-
sation of the ranges of A and B, determined by respective “cutoff thresholds” τA
and τB . Let α be the indicator variable of “A > τA”, and β the indicator variable
of “B > τB”. The symbol Rijc is henceforth reinterpreted as:
Rijc = P (Y = 1 | α = i, β = j, C = c, σAB = ∅), (18)
and likewise Sijc = 1 − Rijc. We reinterpret the inequalities (1)–(4) correspond-
ingly. Note that Rijc is estimable from data on variables A, B and C, gathered
under the observational regime.
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Theorem 4.1 Assume Conditions 1 and 2, and that Conditions 3–5 hold in stra-
tum C = c. Assume also the validity of the uniform positivity condition, that
picu(τA, τB) > 0 for all u (or pic(τA, τB) > 0, when U is empty). Then the
presence of superadditivity in stratum C = c implies A ∗B [W ].
Proof. We proceed by assuming both superaddivity and the interval null hypoth-
esis, and deriving a contradiction. In the following, all probabilities and expecta-
tions are taken under the observational regime σAB = ∅.
Using Condition 4, we have, for i, j = 0, 1:
Sijc = E (SijcU | C = c)
where
Sijcu := P (Y = 0 | α = i, β = j, C = c, U = u).
Thus
S10c + S01c − S11c − S00c = E (S10cU + S01cU − S11cU − S00cU | C = c) . (19)
Let U∗ := {u : S10cu + S01cu − S11cu − S00cu > 0}. On account of (19) and (4),
P (U∗ | C = c) > 0; in particular, U∗ is non-empty. Fix any u∗ ∈ U∗, and define
S∗ij := Sijcu∗, pi
∗(ab) := picu∗(a, b). Then
S∗
11
+ S∗
00
− S∗
10
− S∗
01
< 0. (20)
Now by virtue of Conditions 3 and 4,
S∗ij = E{pi
∗(A,B) | α = i, β = j, C = c}. (21)
Let a > τA and b > τB . By virtue of the interval null hypothesis (14) we then
have
pi0 pi
∗(a, b) ≥ pi∗(a, τB)pi
∗(τA, b) (22)
where pi0 := pi∗(τA, τB) > 0 by assumption; hence
pi0S
∗
11
≥ E{pi∗(A, τB)pi∗(τA, B) | α = 1, β = 1, C = c} (23)
= E{pi∗(A, τB) | α = 1, C = c}
× E{pi∗(τA, B) | β = 1, C = c}
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on using Condition 5. That is, defining
SA := E {pi∗(A, τB) | α = 1, C = c}
SA := E {pi
∗(A, τB) | α = 0, C = c}
SB := E {pi∗(τA, B) | β = 1, C = c}
SB := E {pi∗(τA, B) | β = 0, C = c} ,
we have
pi0S
∗
11
≥ SASB. (24)
Similarly,
pi0S
∗
00
≥ SASB, (25)
while
pi0S
∗
01
≤ SASB, (26)
pi0S
∗
10
≤ SASB. (27)
From these inequalities and (20), we obtain (SA − SA)(SB − SB) < 0. But
by virtue of Condition 2, we have SA ≤ pi0 ≤ SA, SB ≤ pi0 ≤ SB , yielding
(SA − SA)(SB − SB) ≥ 0. This contradiction proves the theorem. ✷
Corollary 1 Suppose that both A and B are binary. Then the conclusion of
Theorem 4.1 holds even if we remove the independence requirement of Condition 5.
Proof. In this case τA = τB = 0, and (23) becomes
pi0S
∗
11
≥ pi∗(1, 0)pi∗(0, 1)
= SASB
so that (24), and similarly (25), (26), (27), continue to hold even without assuming
independence. The rest of the proof is unchanged. ✷
For the next Corollary we introduce the following weaker form of Condition 2,
appropriate for cases where the directionality of the effect is not known a priori:
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Condition 6 The effect of A on Y is either positive, in the sense that P (Y = 1 |
W = w, σAB = ab) is a non-decreasing function of a for all (b, w); or negative,
in the sense that P (Y = 1 | W = w, σAB = ab) is a non-increasing function of a
for all (b, w); and similarly with the roˆles of A and B interchanged.
Corollary 2 Suppose that, in the statement of Theorem 4.1 or Corollary 1, we re-
place Condition 2 by the weaker Condition 6, and at the same time replace the
superadditivity property (2) by the stronger excess risk property (1) (again rein-
terpreted in terms of definition (18)). Then the conclusion remains valid.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Arguing
similarly to that proof, we deduce that there exists a value u∗ of U such that
R∗
11
− R∗
10
−R∗
01
> 0. This implies both
S∗
11
− S∗
10
< 0 (28)
and
S∗
11
− S∗
01
< 0, (29)
as well as (19).
From (28), (24) and (27), we deduce SA(SB − SB) < 0, whence SB < SB. But if
the effect of B were negative we would have SB ≥ SB . Hence the effect of B is
positive. Similarly, using (29), we deduce that the effect of A is positive. The rest
of the proof now follows as before. ✷
Comment. By allowing the dichotomization of A to be arbitrary, the above theo-
rem fits the common situation where the continuous factor is made available in a
dichotomized form, without the possibility of recovering the original continuous
measurements.
Theorem 4.2 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 4.1 hold, with Conditions 3–
5 satisfied by some choice (C ≡ C∗, U ≡ U∗) of variables C and U . Then the
theorem conditions remain satisfied if we replace the choice (C ≡ C∗, U ≡ U∗)
with (C ≡ C∗, U ≡ ∅).
Proof. We shall use the following axiomatic properties [Dawid, 1979] of the
conditional independence relationship:
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Decomposition: X ⊥⊥ Y | Z and W = f(Y ) → X ⊥⊥W | Z
Weak union: X ⊥⊥ Y | Z and W = f(Y ) → X ⊥⊥ Y | (W,Z)
Contraction: X ⊥⊥ Y | Z and X ⊥⊥W | (Y, Z) → X ⊥⊥ (Y,W ) | Z.
where we write W = f(Y ) to mean that W is a function of Y . By weak union,
causal Condition 4 implies U∗⊥⊥ (A,B, σAB) | (A,B,C∗) which, in turn, im-
plies
U∗⊥⊥σAB | (A,B,C
∗) (30)
by decomposition. By contraction, property (30) and causal Condition 3 jointly
imply (Y, U∗)⊥⊥σAB | (A,B,C∗) which, by decomposition, implies
Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (A,B,C
∗). (31)
Replacing the choice (C ≡ C∗, U ≡ U∗) with (C ≡ C∗, U ≡ ∅) leads to
Condition 3 taking the form (31)— which we have just shown to hold, while it
makes Condition 4 vacuous and leaves Condition 5 unaffected. This completes
the proof. ✷
It follows from Theorem 4.2 that, if we wish to check causal conditions 3 and
4 for some choice of context W = (C,U), where C is observed, we could first
check condition 4 for the simpler case of context W = C. If it does not hold in
this case, we know the conditions can not hold for any choice of U .
5 Direct effects interaction
This section of the paper examines relationships between mechanistic interaction
and mediation. Mediation analysis hinges on the concept of direct effect of a vari-
able X on Y . One variant of this concept, the direct effect of X on Y controlling
for F , is meant to quantify the sensitivity of Y to changes in X when F is held
fixed by intervention, that is, when a (perhaps hypothetical) physical intervention
changes the value of X from some reference value x to some value x′ , while F is
set to some constant [Pearl, 2005, Robins and Greenland, 1992]. We connect our
theory to the theory of mediation by defining the concept of mechanistic interac-
tion between A and B when a further variable F , which could itself be affected
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by A and/or B, is set by intervention to a constant. Let Z := W \ F denote the
unmanipulated context variables, and extend the notation (5) by writing
pifz (a, b) := P (Y = 0 | Z = z, σAB = ab, σF = f), (32)
for the probability of Y = 0 given Z = z, conditional on A, B and F being
manipulated to take on values, a, b and f , respectively. Take the the direct effect
of A on Y controlling for (B = b, F = f), in context Z = z, to be measured in
terms of relative probability of negative outcome by the quantity
pifz (a, b)
pifz (a′, b)
. (33)
We say there is no direct mechanistic interaction if the act of setting B to a higher
value can never enhance the direct effect of A, as measured by (33) with a >
a′. This leads to the following generalization of our previous Definition 3.1 of
mechanistic interaction:
Definition 5.1 We say that the causal factors A and B interact mechanistically
to produce Y = 1 under F -intervention if there exist values (f, a > a′, b > b′, z)
for (F,A,B, Z), respectively, such that
pifz (a, b)
pifz (a′, b)
<
pifz (a, b
′)
pifz (a′, b′)
. (34)
In this case we write A ∗ B | F [Z], or A ∗ B | F = f [Z] if interest focuses
a specific value f imposed on F . We alternatively describe condition (34) as
mechanistic interaction between the direct effects of A and B on Y , controlling
for F , in context Z = z.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose
Condition 7 Y ⊥⊥ σF | (A,B, F, Z, σAB).
(That is, conditional on (A,B, F, Z), the dependence of Y on F is not further
affected by the way the value of F has been generated, be it by mere observation
or by intervention.)
Then A ∗B | F [Z] if and only if A ∗B [F, Z].
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Proof. In this case pifz (a, b) = pifz(a, b). ✷
Thus under Condition 7 we can use theorem 4.1 and its Corollaries to investigate
mechanistic interaction between direct effects.
6 Examples
We now illustrate our framework with the aid of the following examples.
Example 1 Brader and colleagues [Valentino et al., 2008] study the reaction of
public opinion to media stories about immigration. White adult participants were
invited to read a mock newspaper story illustrating the costs of immigration. The
story was the same for all individuals, except for the stated ethnicity (latino vs.
white) of the immigrants. Brader (see also [Imai et al., 2013]) found that whites
are more likely to oppose immigration when the story involves latino (rather than
white) immigrants.
We take Brader’s study to be described by the ID of Figure 1, with B representing
the participant’s age, A indicating whether the participant was randomized to a
“latino” or to a “white” story, M representing the participant’s level of “anxiety
about immigration”, as measured through a questionnaire administered at the end
of the reading, G representing observed socio-educational variables and Y = 1
indicating a positive answer to the question: “Do you agree about sending the
Congress a letter of complaint about immigration?”. The ID acknowledges the
influence of socio-educational variables on both anxiety and outcome.
The question whether the total effects of age and ethnical story framing inter-
fere with each other can be addressed on the basis of Brader’s data under the
assumptions of Figure 1, and assuming that the structural conditions and the uni-
form positivity condition are also valid. Suffices to show that with the choice
W ≡ C ≡ U ≡ ∅, the causal conditions for the identifiability of A ∗ B hold. In
fact, with that choice, Condition 4 becomes vacuous and the remaining causal
conditions for the identifiability of A ∗ B take forms Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (A,B) and
A⊥⊥B | σAB , both of which hold in Figure 1. We conclude that the superad-
ditivity condition R11 − R01 − R10 + R00 > 0 (or its excess risk equivalent if
appropriate) is a valid basis for a population-wide test of A ∗B in Brader’s study.
✷
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Example 2 We shall now continue our analysis of Brader’s study. We shall con-
tinue to take Figure 1 as a valid representation of the problem, and to assume the
validity of the structural and uniform positivity conditions. Under these assump-
tions, we shall now show that the question whether A and B interact within a
specific socio-epidemiological stratum (any problem with the fact this latter is a
post-treatment variable) can be addressed on the basis of the study data. Suffices
to show that with the choices W ≡ C ≡ G and U ≡ ∅, the causal conditions for
the identifiability ofA∗B [G] hold. In fact, with that choice, Condition 4 becomes
vacuous and the remaining causal conditions for the identifiability take forms
Y ⊥⊥σAB | (A,B,G) and A⊥⊥B | (G, σAB), both of which hold in Figure 1.
We conclude that the presence of superadditivity in a G = g stratum of the popu-
lation,
R11g − R01g −R10g +R00g > 0 (35)
in Brader’s study impliesA∗B [G]. Furthermore, Condition 7 for the equivalence
ofA∗B [G] andA∗B | G takes the form Y ⊥⊥σG | (A,B,G, σAB), which holds
in Figure 1. It follows that, in Brader’s study, evidence in favour of (35) (or of the
corresponding excess risk condition, if appropriate) will support the hypothesis of
an interaction between the direct effects of A and B on Y unmediated by G.
✷
Example 3 Consider the class of problems described by Figure 1, and take all
variables to be observed, with A, B and Y binary. Consider the question whether
the effects of A and B interact mechanistically within a stratum M = m,G = g
of the population. This question can be addressed on the basis of the data in this
example. To see this consider that, with the choices W ≡ (G,M) ≡ C and
U ≡ ∅, the causal conditions for the identifiability of A ∗ B [M,G], are satisfied.
This is because, with those choices, Condition 4 becomes vacuous, Condition 5
does not apply because A and B are binary, and Condition 3 takes the form
Y ⊥⊥σAB | (A,B,G,M), which follows from Figure 1. We conclude that, when-
ever the remaining (structural and uniform positivity) conditions for identifiability
hold, the presence of superadditivity in a (M = m,G = g) stratum of the popula-
tion,
R11mg − R01mg − R10mg +R00mg > 0, (36)
implies A ∗B [M,G] in this example.
Furthermore, Condition 7 for the equivalence ofA∗B [M,G] and A∗B | (M,G)
takes the form Y ⊥⊥ (σM , σG) | (A,B,G,M, σAB), which follows from Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Influence diagram for Example 4.
Hence, in this example, evidence of superadditivity in the sense of (36) (or of ex-
cess risk, if appropriate) will corroborate the hypothesis of a direct effects interac-
tion between the effects ofA andB on Y , unmediated by (M,G): A∗B | (M,G).
However in the more general case where A or B are non-binary, it will not be pos-
sible to ignore causal condition 5, which is in fact violated in this example. ✷
Example 4 Consider the class of problems described by the influence diagram of
Figure 2. Take the variable V , which is a putative common direct influence on
G and Y , but not a direct influence on M , to be unobserved. Let all other vari-
ables in the diagram be observed, with A,B and Y binary. Consider the question
whether the total effects ofA and B interact mechanistically. This question can be
addressed on the basis of the data in this example. To see this, consider that, with
the choice W ≡ ∅, the causal conditions for the identifiability of A ∗ B, are satis-
fied. This is because with that choice Condition 4 becomes vacuous, Condition 5
does not apply since A and B are binary, and Condition 3 in this case takes the
form Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (A,B), which follows from the graph in Figure 2. We conclude
that, whenever the remaining (structural and uniform positivity) conditions for
identifiability hold, the presence of superadditivity in the sense of
R11 − R01 − R10 +R00 > 0,
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or of excess risk if appropriate, implies A ∗ B in this example. Now consider
the question whether the effects of A and B interact mechanistically in a specific
stratum M = m,G = g of the population. This question can be addressed on
the basis of the data in this example. To see this, consider that, with the choices
W ≡ C ≡ (M,G) and U ≡ ∅, the causal conditions for the identifiability of
A ∗ B [M,G], are satisfied. This is because, with those choices, Condition 4 be-
comes vacuous and Condition 5 can be dropped on the grounds that A and B are
binary, while Condition 3 takes the form Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (M,G,A,B), which holds
in the graph. We conclude that, whenever the remaining (structural and uniform
positivity) conditions for identifiability hold, the presence of superadditivity in the
sense of
R11mg − R01mg − R10mg +R00mg > 0, (37)
or of excess risk if appropriate, implies A ∗B [M,G] in this example.
Next consider the question whether the direct effects of A and B on Y , unmedi-
ated by M , interact mechanistically in a stratum G = g of the population. This
question can be addressed on the basis of the data in this example. This is be-
cause Condition 7 for the equivalence of the interaction A ∗ B [M,G] (which
we have proved testable in this example) and A ∗ B | M [G] takes the form
Y ⊥⊥σM | (A,B,M,G, σAB), which follows from the graph in Figure 2. We con-
clude that a test of the superadditivity condition (37) will test the hypothesis that
the direct effects of A and B on Y , unmediated by M , interact mechanistically in
a stratum G = g of the population. The result of the test will, in general, depend
on the chosen values for m and g. ✷
Example 5 Consider the class of problems described by the influence diagram of
Figure 3, and take all the variables in this diagram to be observed. In this example,
the σAB → G arrow indicates that the probability distribution ofG may depend on
whether the values of A and B are generated observationally or interventionally.
The question whether the total effects of A and B interact mechanistically, in the
sense of A ∗ B, cannot be addressed on the basis of the data in this example,
the reason being that Condition 3 for this interaction to be identifiable takes the
form Y ⊥⊥σAB | (A,B), which does not hold in this case. The culprit here is the
σAB → G arrow.
But consider the question whether the effects of A and B interact in a specific
stratum G = g of the population. This question can be addressed on the basis
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Figure 3: Causal diagram for Example 5
of the data in this example. To see this, consider that, with the choices W ≡
G ≡ C and U ≡ ∅ the causal conditions for the identifiability of A ∗ B [G],
are satisfied. This is because, with those choices, Condition 4 becomes vacuous
and the remaining causal conditions take the forms Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (G,A,B) and
A⊥⊥B | (G, σAB), both of which hold in the graph. We conclude that, whenever
the remaining (structural and uniform positivity) conditions for identifiability hold,
the presence of superadditivity in the sense of
R11g −R01g − R10g +R00g > 0, (38)
or of excess risk if appropriate, implies A ∗B [G] in this example.
Next consider the question whether the direct effects ofA andB on Y , unmediated
by G, interact mechanistically. This question can be addressed on the basis of
the data in this example. This is because Condition 7 for the equivalence of the
interaction A∗B [G] (which we have proved testable in this example) and A∗B |
G takes the form Y ⊥⊥ σG | (A,B,G, σAB), which follows from the graph in
Figure 2. We conclude that a test of the superadditivity condition (38) will test
the hypothesis that the direct effects of A and B on Y , unmediated by G, interact
mechanistically. ✷
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Example 6 Finally consider the class of problems described by the influence dia-
gram of Figure 4, and take all the variables in this diagram to be observed.
Consider the question whether the effects of A and B interact in a specific stratum
M = m,G = g of the population. This question can be addressed on the basis of
the data in this example. To see this, consider that, with the choices W ≡ C ≡
(M,G) and U ≡ ∅, the causal conditions for the identifiability of A ∗ B[M,G],
are satisfied. This is because, with those choices, Condition 4 becomes vacuous
and the remaining causal conditions take the forms Y ⊥⊥ σAB | (A,B,M,G) and
A⊥⊥B | (M,G, σAB), both of which hold in the graph of Figure 4. We conclude
that, whenever the remaining (structural and uniform positivity) conditions for
identifiability hold, the presence of superadditivity in the sense of
R11mg − R01mg − R10mg +R00mg > 0,
or of excess risk if appropriate, implies A ∗B[M,G] in this example.
Next consider the question whether the direct effects ofA andB on Y , unmediated
by M or G, interact mechanistically. This question can be addressed on the basis
of the data in this example. This is because Condition 7 for the equivalence of
the interaction A ∗B[M,G] (which we have proved testable in this example) and
A∗B | (M,G) takes the form Y ⊥⊥ (σG, σM) | (A,B,G,M, σAB), which follows
from the graph in Figure 4. ✷
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7 Causality and agency
Some of the above examples raise some issues of the interpretation of “causality”
in our approach. According to our description so far, that concept has been closely
tied to the possibility of making external interventions to set values for the “causal
variables” A and B. This conception is in line with philosophical “agency” theo-
ries of causality, Price [1991], Hausman [1998], Woodward [2003], which regard
causes as handles for manipulating effects. However, such an anthropocentric
manipulationist view is unnecessarily restrictive, and can hamper application of
causal inference to numerous scientific disciplines that demand a more general
notion of cause, not tied simply to what human agents can do.
In the first two examples above, while the variable A = “stated ethnicity” was
manipulable (and was manipulated), we can not reasonably regard the variable
B = “age of participant” as manipulable. We might however conceive of being
able to observe an individual at various points of her life, and be interested in the
way in which her age then might make a difference to her psychological response
to certain media framing techniques. Psychologists have knowledge, theories and
hypotheses about the role of age in the response process. They can, for example,
make informed guesses about - and explain on the basis of psychological theories
- the different outcome we might have observed had the individual been younger
or older than he is (e.g., “young people tend to react with less anxiety”). Spe-
cific psychological mechanisms and reactions are associated with young age. We
should not give up looking into them simply because the age variable falls outside
the standard manipulability theory of causation.
As another example, in epidemiology it is often appropriate to consider, as a cause
of a disease, a variable such as genotype, whose manipulation by human beings is
not practically possible; and application of mechanistic interaction tests to inves-
tigations of epistasis or pharmacogenomics will require a broader conception of
“intervention” than the agency approach typically supplies. Recent discussions of
the topic [Woodward, 2013] have loosened the strict confines of the manipulation-
ist theory, regarding as an “intervention” any appropriate (in a sense that has to
be made clear) exogenous causal process, without any necessary connection with
human action.
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8 Related work
A recent paper by VanderWeele and Robins [2012] (hereafter VR) tackles mech-
anistic interaction via stochastic (rather than deterministic) potential outcomes
(POs). In the standard PO formulation, the value that Y would take in individ-
ual ω in response to an intervention that sets (A,B) to values (a, b) is regarded
as a potential outcome, Yab(ω). Potential outcomes are fixed for each particular
individual even before the treatment is applied, and unaffected by the particular
regime in which the values ofA andB are set. VR relax this by allowing each indi-
vidual ω to be characterized by a stochastic potential outcome, Yab(ω), that varies
in the individual according to a Bernoulli distribution with the expected value
fixed by the intervention and by random circumstances, although these latter are
assumed not to be affected by the treatment. Because of the latter constraint, it is
not clear whether VR’s approach, as currently formulated, copes with situations
where a stochastic mediator of the effect of (A,B) on Y introduces intervention-
dependent random‘. variation1.
Ramsahai [2013] gives a fully probabilistic account of mechanistic interaction,
which boasts aspects of greater generality relative to ours, including freedom from
monotonicity assumptions about the effects of A and B. There are also aspects
of lesser generality: no attempt is made in Ramsahai’ paper to examine the im-
plications of the presence of continuous causal factors. It is therefore appropriate
to proceed by comparing Ramsahai’s method and ours in the special case where
A and B are binary variables, with (a, a′, b, b′) ≡ (1, 0, 1, 0). In this special case,
our condition for presence of mechanistic interaction, as expressed by (16), spe-
cializes to
piw(1, 1)
piw(0, 1)
<
piw(1, 0)
piw(0, 0)
. (39)
1We also note that in Rubin’s standard PO formulation there is a value of the response for each
individual and possible intervention, and such value is constant across all possible regimes, in the
sense that it is not affected by the way the values of A and B are generated. In VR’s approach, the
response has its expected value fixed by the particular individual, set of random circumstances and
intervention. But conditional on this expected value, is the realized value of the response assumed
to vary across regimes? In other words, is the observationally detected response identical to what
I would have observed had I fixed the same treatment by intervention? And, if the answer to the
above question is negative, are the regime-specific versions of the response assumed independent?
We feel that the question matters to the very purpose of carrying inferences from the observational
to other regimes. These considerations are related to certain ambiguities of counterfactual-based
formulations of causality [Dawid, 2000]
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As seen in §3.3, under Condition 2, Equation (39) implies strictly positive mono-
tonicity of the effects of A and B upon Y , as expressed by the inequalities
piw(1, 1) < piw(1, 0), (40)
piw(1, 1) < piw(0, 1). (41)
In our approach, these inequalities are consistent with, but not sufficient for, the
presence of mechanistic interaction. In fact, consistently with our concluding
remarks of § 3.1, inequalities (40)– (41) do not imply (39). By contrast, in Ram-
sahai’s approach, those inequalities are taken to define mechanistic interaction
for binary variables. Hence Ramsahai’s definition of mechanistic interaction is
weaker than ours. The more exacting nature of our definition of mechanistic inter-
action, combined with allowance for continuity, explains the stronger assumptions
required in our approach compared to those of Ramsahai.
To elucidate the differences between the approaches, suppose that, in the bowling
example, A (the first player’s ball size) takes value 0 (the player has no ball to
throw) or 1 (the player throws a ball). Interpret B analogously. It then seems
reasonable, on the basis of physics and common sense, to assume that inequalities
(40)–(41) hold in this example. In Ramsahai’s formulation, this is sufficient to
conclude in favour of mechanistic interaction between the effects of the throws of
the two players, even before looking into the data, and even if the two players act
independently. This appears to clash with our psychological notion of synergism.
By contrast, in our formulation, in order to conclude in favour of mechanistic
interaction, conditions (40)–(41) are not sufficient because they do not contradict
the intuitive idea of independent throws expressed by (6).
To conclude, we note that our approach uses statistics (excess risk and superad-
ditivity) which are often testable at negligible computational cost in prospective
studies, and (approximately and under assumptions) also in retrospective studies.
By contrast, attention needs to be paid to the computational feasibility of Ramsa-
hai’s approach.
9 Discussion
Mechanistic interaction has often been tackled within a potential outcome frame-
work [Rubin, 1974] or within an equivalent formulation of causality. We have dis-
cussed possible limitations of this approach. We have also discussed limitations of
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current approaches to mechanistic interaction which reject the potential outcome
formulation in favour of the standard probability formalism. Motivated by the
limitations of the previous approaches, we have proposed a novel definition of the
causal notion of mechanistic interaction, and presented sufficient conditions for its
identification from observational data. Because these conditions are expressed in
terms of conditional independence, they hold irrespective of particular parametric
or distributional assumptions about the problem variables. A further advantage of
our conditional independence formulation of the identifiability conditions is that
these can be straightforwardly checked on a causal diagram of the problem, when
this is available. The use of causal diagrams for the mentioned purposes has been
extensively illustrated.
Our theory provides conditions for testing for mechanistic interaction in (real or
hypothetical) situations in which an intervention is exerted on variables (even post-
treatment ones) different from the main factors A and B of interest. We have
discussed the connection between this and the idea of mechanistic interaction be-
tween effects that flow along specific paths in a causal diagram representation of
the problem.
Importantly, our method does not require the assumption that Y depends on its
causal influences in a functional way. By relaxing such an assumption, our method
gains applicability in a much wider range of situations, and confers more leeway
on the researcher in the choice of the conditioning variables in the test.
Once the conditions for a test of the mechanistic interaction of interest have been
found valid, the actual test involves simple (and well known) excess risk or super-
additivity statistics. These tests are valid under prospective sampling and (under
assumptions) retrospective sampling. In the latter case, a key assumption is that
the response event of interest is rare under any possible configuration of the causal
factors. In the context of retrospective case-control studies in epidemiology, this
is the well-known rare disease assumption that typically motivates this kind of
studies.
Finally, our approach embraces the very large class of applications where the main
causal factors, A and B, are only available as a discretized version of the funda-
mental variables, no longer available in their original continuous form.
Various possible enhancements of the method are envisaged, one of these be-
ing the extension of the theory to embrace higher-order mechanistic interactions.
Equally important will be the application of the method in a variety of situations
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and disciplines, from genetic epidemiology (e.g., in the identification of gene-
environment interactions) to experimental psychology. We hope that the proposed
method will help researchers better to identify from data analysis small sets of
interactions underlying mechanisms of scientific interest.
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